threat
SolidMap every trust boundary and what validates it — rung 1, SAFE. Use when the user says "procoder threat", "threat model", "trust boundaries", "attack surface", "security review", "where does untrusted input enter", "what's our exposure", or invokes /procoder:threat. Produces a boundary table with gaps, not a STRIDE essay.
Install
Quality Score: 84/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- azrtydxb
- Repository
- azrtydxb/procoder
- Created
- 3 weeks ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- Go
- License
- Apache-2.0
Integrates with
Bundled in these plugins
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
assess-threats
Use when an agent needs to identify trust boundaries and architectural threat vectors in a system design or a change's attack surface; maps the boundaries, applies STRIDE, and rates threats by risk rather than executing exploits or patching code.
secure-coding
Implementation-level defensive practice - validating input at boundaries, handling secrets, avoiding injection, safe error handling, dependency hygiene, and safe defaults. Use while writing or reviewing code that parses external input, builds queries or commands, handles credentials or tokens, serialises data, or manages permissions. Complements threat-modeling, which decides what to defend, by covering how to implement the defence.
tinfoil
Makes your AI agent think like the security reviewer who assumes every input is hostile until the code proves otherwise. Not paranoid — just right often enough that it stopped being funny. Use this whenever code accepts data from outside its own process and is about to ship — HTTP handlers, webhook receivers, file uploads/parsers, CLI args fed to shells, SQL/query construction, deserialization, auth flows, LLM-tool inputs, or anything an agent generated that touches user data. Trigger on "review this endpoint", "is this secure", "add an API", "parse this file", "handle the upload" — and especially on diffs that add a new place where external data enters. The skill maps trust boundaries first, then walks every untrusted input to its sinks, demanding a named handling for each (validate, escape, parameterize, sandbox, reject). Ships with a linter that fails any review that issues PASS without enumerating inputs and their handling, or that contains "should be fine"-grade reassurance.