threat-modelinglisted

# Threat Modeling This threat-models a system's components and data flows, not its code. Pick the one reference the task needs; don't load all four. | Task | File | |---|---| | Identify threats per component/interaction (STRIDE questionnaires, DFD trust-boundary analysis, threat-model doc template) | `references/stride.md` | | Map attack paths (OR/AND node model, path + coverage analysis, worked account-takeover example) | `references/attack-trees.md` | | Turn threats into requirements (STRIDE -> requirement patterns, compliance mapping with PCI-DSS/HIPAA/GDPR/OWASP-ASVS control IDs; SOC2/NIST CSF/ISO 27001 have no control-id table) | `references/requirements.md` | | Choose and prioritize controls (standard-controls library, defense-in-depth layering, coverage + gap analysis) | `references/mitigations.md` | ## Core Model STRIDE categories and the property each violates: | Threat | Property violated | |---|---| | Spoofing | Authentication | | Tampering | Integrity | | Repudiation | Non-repudiation | | Information disclosure | Confidentiality | | Denial of service | Availability | | Elevation of privilege | Authorization | Attack trees: root = attacker goal; OR nodes (any child suffices), AND nodes (all children required), leaves = concrete attack steps scored by difficulty, cost, and detection risk. Cheapest complete path = priority defense target. Control categories, in layering order: preventive (stop), detective (notice), corrective (recover). Deterrent and compensat