web2-vuln-classes

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Complete reference for 26 web2 bug classes with root causes, detection patterns, bypass tables, exploit techniques, and real paid examples. Covers IDOR, auth bypass, XSS, SSRF (11 IP bypass techniques), SQLi, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC, file upload (10 bypass techniques), GraphQL, LLM/AI (ASI01-ASI10 agentic framework), API misconfig (mass assignment, JWT attacks, prototype pollution, CORS), ATO taxonomy (9 paths), SSTI (Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/ERB/Spring), subdomain takeover, cloud/infra misconfigs, HTTP smuggling (CL.TE/TE.CL/H2.CL), cache poisoning, MFA bypass (7 patterns), SAML attacks (XSW/comment injection/signature stripping), error disclosure / debug endpoints (stack trace regex per framework, chain templates), CSS injection (attribute-selector exfiltration, opacity clickjacking, @import). LFI / file inclusion -> RCE (php://filter source disclosure, iconv filter-chain RCE with no upload, log/environ poisoning, .user.ini/.htaccess auto_prepend, data:// + expect:// wrappers, session incl

Web & Frontend 4,744 stars 838 forks Updated 6 days ago MIT

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# WEB2 BUG CLASSES โ€” 26 Classes Root cause, pattern, bypass table, chaining opportunity, real paid examples. > **Auth-required classes** (๐Ÿ”): the ones below need **at least one logged-in > session** loaded into the hunt to be testable. Use `hunt.py --auth-file > .private/T.json` or `--cookie/--bearer` flags โ€” every recon/scan tool then > inherits the headers automatically. For IDOR/BOLA/priv-esc, load **two > sessions** (low- and high-priv) and diff. See `docs/auth-sessions.md`. > > ๐Ÿ” IDOR ยท Broken Auth/Access Control ยท Mass Assignment ยท OAuth/OIDC ยท JWT ยท > GraphQL field-level auth ยท LLM/AI chatbot IDOR ยท MFA (rate-limit + response > manipulation tests) ยท ATO chains ยท SSRF behind login > > The MFA workflow-skip and SAML signature-stripping probes intentionally > stay **unauthenticated** even when a session is loaded โ€” that's the > attack premise. --- ## 1. IDOR โ€” INSECURE DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE ๐Ÿ” > #1 most paid web2 class โ€” 30% of all submissions that get paid. > **Needs two sessions** (A=attacker, B=victim) โ€” load both via `--auth-file` > and diff audit-log `session_id` hashes to confirm cross-tenant access. ### Root Cause ```python # VULNERABLE โ€” no ownership check @app.route('/api/orders/<order_id>') def get_order(order_id): order = db.query("SELECT * FROM orders WHERE id = ?", order_id) return jsonify(order) # Never checks if order belongs to current user! # SECURE @app.route('/api/orders/<order_id>') def get_order(order_id): order = db.query("SEL...

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Author
shuvonsec
Repository
shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty
Created
6 months ago
Last Updated
6 days ago
Language
Python
License
MIT

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