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sota-skill-securitylisted

Security for AI agent skills, plugins and instruction bundles (2026) — the supply chain of things that tell an agent what to do. Use when installing, authoring, reviewing, updating or auditing any skill, plugin, ruleset or agent file an agent loads as instructions, including your own; when a repository you do not fully trust contains agent-readable instruction files; and when deciding what an installed skill may reach. Covers provenance and pinning, review-before-install, the instruction trust boundary, precedence and shadowing between overlapping skills, capability minimisation, revocation, and auditing a skill for guidance that is confidently wrong. Not for prompt injection arriving in ordinary application data — use sota-code-security rules/08. Trigger keywords: skill, agent skill, SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, instruction file, plugin, marketplace, skill install, skill provenance, skill pinning, malicious skill, skill shadowing, agent trust boundary.
martinholovsky/SOTA-skills · ★ 18 · AI & Automation · score 78
Install: claude install-skill martinholovsky/SOTA-skills
# SOTA Skill & Instruction-Bundle Security (2026) ## Purpose A skill is **executable influence**. It does not run in the interpreter, it runs in the model — and the model then runs the tools. Everything the software supply chain learned about dependencies applies to instruction bundles, with one difference that makes it worse: **a malicious dependency has to be invoked, and a malicious skill only has to be loaded.** This skill exists because the ecosystem now has all the ingredients of a supply chain — marketplaces, plugins, `git clone` installs, auto-loading descriptions, transitive resources — and almost none of the controls. A library that tells everyone else to pin, verify provenance, and minimise capability, while installing its own instructions by curl, has not noticed it is a supply chain. **The trust boundary is the point.** Anyone who can modify a file your agent loads as instructions can change what your agent does, in every session, silently. That includes a repository you cloned to review, a teammate's PR that touches `AGENTS.md`, a skill that fetches a resource at load time, and a marketplace entry that updated since you read it. Applies in both directions: **defending** (what you install and what your repo lets an agent load) and **authoring** (making your own skill safe for others to install, and auditing whether its guidance is right). ## BUILD mode Use when installing, authoring or updating anything an agent loads as instructions. 1. **Establish prove