agent-vault-credential-brokerlisted

# Agent Vault (Infisical) — credential broker for agent processes Built and verified end-to-end 2026-08-31 deploying a new instance and cutting an existing OpenClaw gateway over to it. It's a **research preview** — re-check `https://github.com/Infisical/agent-vault` and its `docs/` folder before trusting any exact command here to still be current. ## What it actually protects against (and what it doesn't) Agent Vault intercepts an agent's **own outbound HTTPS API calls** via a local MITM proxy (`HTTPS_PROXY` + a trusted CA) and injects the real credential at the network layer — the agent process's own environment only ever holds a placeholder. This is the right tool when the agent *itself* holds a raw provider key and makes its own outbound calls with it (an OpenClaw/Hermes- style gateway, a service account). It does **not** help with a human-driven interactive session (e.g. Claude Code on a laptop) exposing a secret via an SSH command's output or shell history — that's a command-construction/history-hygiene problem, not a network-credential-injection one. Don't scope a pilot at "stop this specific SSH leak" without checking the mechanism actually covers it first. ## Deployment placement **Must run on a separate machine from the agent(s) it protects** — the vendor's own docs are explicit about this; co-locating defeats the isolation (a compromised agent session could reach the local vault/master password). For a Proxmox-based fleet with a VMID convention, this is exactly