security-checklists

Solid

Progressive-disclosure security-depth modules for the security-reviewer. Holds boundary-keyed checklists (access-control, authn-session, injection, path-and-file, secrets-and-crypto, outbound-ssrf, supply-chain, config-misconfig, exceptional-conditions, llm-agent, agentic-skills) as references/, each anchored on a current standard (OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, API Security Top 10:2023, Proactive Controls 2024, CWE Top 25, OWASP LLM Top 10:2025, OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications:2026, OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 v1.0 (AST01–AST10)). The work-loop's orchestrator loads only the boundary-matching modules and inlines them into the security-reviewer's brief; the subagent never self-discovers this skill. Not a reviewer prompt itself — it is the depth library the reviewer reasons from.

AI & Automation 14 stars 4 forks Updated today Apache-2.0

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Quality Score: 80/100

Stars 20%
39
Recency 20%
100
Frontmatter 20%
70
Documentation 15%
100
Issue Health 10%
80
License 10%
100
Description 5%
100

Skill Content

# Skill: security-checklists This skill is the **depth library** behind the `security-reviewer` agent. The reviewer's body carries the *universal method* (the three-bucket delegation rule, load-context-first, the always-on STRIDE + LINDDUN open pass, the established-helper-bypass meta-check, the severity rubric, the honest-limits footer, the output format). The *shape-specific depth* — what to actually check at each trust boundary — lives here, in the per-boundary `references/<module>.md` modules, so the agent prompt stays lean and the depth scales without bloat. > **Reliability-vs-security carve.** This library owns *security* config; the > *reliability / ops* side of infrastructure (idempotent convergence, blast > radius, environment isolation, cost/teardown, drift/rollback, > observability/smoke) lives in the [`operational-safety`](../operational-safety/SKILL.md) > skill, consumed by `quality-engineer`. The routing splits IaC-security → > `config-misconfig`, IaC-reliability → `operational-safety`. The two are > complementary lenses on the same infra diff — keep the split clean both ways. ## How it loads (orchestrator-driven, not self-discovered) **The orchestrator drives loading; the subagent does not.** There is no mechanism to force a subagent to invoke a skill, skill discovery is model-invoked and adapter-variable, and the `security-reviewer`'s `tools:` list does not even include a Skill tool. So depth must not depend on the reviewer finding this library itself. Co...

Details

Author
eugenelim
Repository
eugenelim/agent-ready-repo
Created
2 months ago
Last Updated
today
Language
Python
License
Apache-2.0

Bundled in these plugins

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Progressive-disclosure operational-safety-depth modules for the work-loop. Holds failure-mode-keyed checklists the quality-engineer reviewer reasons from (state-and-idempotency, blast-radius, environment-isolation, cost-and-teardown, drift-and-rollback, observability-and-smoke), plus cloud-implementation-craft, the module also inlined into the implementer's EXECUTE brief. Each is grounded in standing operational taxonomy (AWS Well-Architected, Google SRE, the Terraform/Pulumi Day-1/Day-2 split). The orchestrator loads only the matching modules and inlines them into the reviewer's REVIEW brief — and cloud-implementation-craft into the implementer's EXECUTE brief — when infra/destructive work is detected; the subagent never self-discovers this skill. Not a reviewer prompt itself — it is the depth library the reviewer and implementer reason from. Carves against security-checklists on the reliability-vs-security lens.

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