hunt-llm-ai
FeaturedHunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web pages/email the model reads, ASCII smuggling (Unicode Tags block U+E0000-U+E007F, invisible to humans, decoded by the model), tool-use exfiltration (model has fetch/browse tool, attacker injects OOB URL, model exfils chat history/secrets), markdown-image zero-click exfil, system-prompt extraction, IDOR-via-AI (cross-tenant data). Targets: chatbots, RAG, summarizers, agentic copilots, MCP tools. Detection: any LLM-backed endpoint, doc upload triggering AI processing, autonomous agent with tools. Validate: OOB/Collaborator callback for exfil, verbatim-reproducible system-prompt leak (run twice), verifiable cross-tenant leak or RCE. Confabulation is NOT a finding. Use when hunting AI features, chatbots, RAG, agentic systems, MCP.
Install
Quality Score: 96/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- elementalsouls
- Repository
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
- Created
- 4 months ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- Python
- License
- MIT
Integrates with
Bundled in these plugins
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
ai-prompt-injection
Test LLM-backed apps for prompt injection (direct + indirect) and its consequences: data exfil, tool/function abuse, guardrail bypass. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/ agent, summarizes untrusted content, has tools/functions, or does RAG. Signals: "ask AI", system prompts, function-calling, "summarize this URL/file", agentic actions.
prompt-injection-audit
Audit an LLM-backed feature (chatbot, AI assistant, agent, RAG app) for prompt-injection exposure. Read-only analysis that produces findings, not fixes. Use this whenever someone asks whether their AI or LLM feature is safe or secure, whether it can be tricked, jailbroken, or talked into leaking data or ignoring its instructions, or asks for a security or vulnerability review of code that calls a model (OpenAI, Anthropic, LangChain, LlamaIndex, and similar). Triggers on phrasings like "can someone make my chatbot leak other users' data", "is my AI assistant safe from prompt injection", "review my LLM endpoint for security holes", "check if my agent's tools can be abused", or pasting model-calling code and asking if it's exploitable. Do not trigger for general feature-building help with no security question, or for security reviews of code that does not involve an LLM.
ai--llm-security
LLM and AI application security testing — prompt injection, jailbreak resistance, OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), RAG and agent/tool-use security, model supply chain, and AI red teaming for authorized assessments