hunt-llm-ai
FeaturedHunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web pages/email the model reads, ASCII smuggling (Unicode Tags block U+E0000-U+E007F, invisible to humans, decoded by the model), tool-use exfiltration (model has fetch/browse tool, attacker injects OOB URL, model exfils chat history/secrets), markdown-image zero-click exfil, system-prompt extraction, IDOR-via-AI (cross-tenant data). Targets: chatbots, RAG, summarizers, agentic copilots, MCP tools. Detection: any LLM-backed endpoint, doc upload triggering AI processing, autonomous agent with tools. Validate: OOB/Collaborator callback for exfil, verbatim-reproducible system-prompt leak (run twice), verifiable cross-tenant leak or RCE. Confabulation is NOT a finding. Use when hunting AI features, chatbots, RAG, agentic systems, MCP.
Install
Quality Score: 96/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- elementalsouls
- Repository
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
- Created
- 4 months ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- Python
- License
- MIT
Integrates with
Bundled in these plugins
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ai-prompt-injection
Test LLM-backed apps for prompt injection (direct + indirect) and its consequences: data exfil, tool/function abuse, guardrail bypass. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/ agent, summarizes untrusted content, has tools/functions, or does RAG. Signals: "ask AI", system prompts, function-calling, "summarize this URL/file", agentic actions.