telegram-safetylisted

# Telegram account safety This code drives a real person's personal account over MTProto. Getting it wrong does not fail a test - it gets the account restricted or permanently banned, and appeals are not guaranteed. Authority: [docs/10-product/srs.md](../../../docs/10-product/srs.md) `SPEC-SND-*` and [docs/70-ops/security.md](../../../docs/70-ops/security.md). ## The Send Guard - never weaken it `tg_send_message` sends nothing when the Peer is not the account itself, is not in the Peer Index, has no message history, **and** is not in contacts. **You may not** add a `force` / `skip_check` / `allow_unknown` parameter, send first and warn after, resolve the target another way to route around it, or suggest a workaround to the user. When it fires: tell the user, or call `tg_add_contact` if they already asked for exactly that. Reasoning and rejected alternatives: [ADR-0005](../../../docs/20-architecture/adr/0005-hard-block-send-to-unknown-peers.md). ## The constants are load-bearing | Constant | Value | Do not | | --- | --- | --- | | `MAX_CHUNK_CHARS` | 4000 | Raise it. Telegram's hard limit is 4096 and the margin absorbs client formatting | | `CHUNK_DELAY_SECONDS` | 2.5 | Lower it. Bursts to one peer are what rate limits react to | | `SYNC_DIALOG_DELAY_SECONDS` | 1.0 | Lower it. Rapid history requests read as automation | ## Error handling - Every tool is wrapped in `@guarded_tool` and returns text. Nothing raises. - Expected conditions: `raise ToolError("...")` - becom