crypto-reviewlisted

Crypto-misuse review — non-constant-time comparison of secrets (timing side-channels), missing/compiler-elidable zeroization of secrets, and non-cryptographic RNG used to mint secrets. The crypto-reviewer agent confirms each candidate handles a secret and promotes real issues into .kuzushi/findings.json (source "crypto-review"). Distinct from /sast (injection) and /sharp-edges (API design).
allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin · ★ 0 · Code & Development · score 62

Install: claude install-skill allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

# Crypto review Find the crypto-implementation footguns that look fine but leak or weaken secrets. 1. Run `node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/crypto-review-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>"` (optionally `--input '{"maxCandidates":30}'`). If it reports `no-candidates`, say so and stop. Read the prep's `prepPath`. 2. For **each** candidate, open the site and **first confirm the value is secret-derived**, then assess by category: timing-side-channel (variable-time compare of a secret), missing-zeroization (secret not securely wiped / elidable `memset`), or weak-crypto-rng (non-CSPRNG minting a token/key/nonce). Decide `finding` / `candidate` / `rejected`. 3. Write the `{ candidates: [...] }` bundle to the prep's `draftPath`, then run the `assembleCommand` — it validates verdicts/categories and promotes them into `.kuzushi/findings.json` (`source:"crypto-review"`). 4. Report findings by category (file:line, the leak/weakness, and the constant-time / secure-zero / CSPRNG fix to use). ## When NOT to use - On code with no cryptographic / secret handling — nothing to review. - For injection or API-design misuse — that's `/sast`, `/taint-analysis`, and `/sharp-edges`. ## Rationalizations to Reject - *"Just a string compare."* → If a side is a secret (MAC/token/hash), a variable-time compare leaks it; confirm secret-derivation before clearing. - *"memset wipes it."* → A plain `memset` on a dying buffer is often optimized away; only a secure-zero