auditing-uefi-firmware-with-chipsec

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Use Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats.

AI & Automation 46 stars 7 forks Updated 3 days ago MIT

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# Auditing UEFI Firmware with CHIPSEC > **Authorized Use Only:** CHIPSEC loads a kernel driver and reads/writes low-level hardware registers, SPI flash, and SMM. Run it only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess, ideally on dedicated test hardware. Misuse (especially write/modify modules) can brick a machine. Never run write-capable modules on production systems. ## Overview CHIPSEC is the open-source **Platform Security Assessment Framework** created by Intel's Advanced Threat Research team. It inspects the low-level security configuration of x86 platform firmware and hardware — the layer below the operating system where bootkits and firmware implants live. CHIPSEC loads a signed kernel driver (Linux, Windows, or it can run from the UEFI shell) to read and write hardware registers, Model-Specific Registers (MSRs), PCI config space, SPI flash, and UEFI variables, then runs an automated test suite that checks whether the platform's defensive locks are actually engaged. The threat CHIPSEC addresses is MITRE ATT&CK **T1542.001 — Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware**: adversaries who modify system firmware (the BIOS/UEFI image on SPI flash) to gain stealthy, persistent, OS-survivable control. Firmware implants persist across OS reinstall and disk replacement and are invisible to most EDR. CHIPSEC's value is verifying the *prerequisites* that prevent such implants: that the SPI flash BIOS region is write-protected (BIOS_CNTL `BLE`/`SMM_BWP`, SPI Protected Ranges),...

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Author
adriannoes
Repository
adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai
Created
9 months ago
Last Updated
3 days ago
Language
Jupyter Notebook
License
MIT

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