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hunting-defi-economic-and-oracle-flawslisted

Hunt a decentralized-finance protocol for a way to profit by moving a price or breaking an economic invariant, rather than by defeating an access check or re-entering. Covers a price read from a spot source an attacker can move within a transaction, a manipulable oracle or a single-source feed with no sanity bound, a swap or liquidation that trusts a pool ratio a flash loan can skew, rounding or fee-accounting that a repeated interaction drains, share or collateral math that lets a first or precise depositor steal value, and a slippage or deadline parameter left unchecked. Use when the fix is an economic or pricing safeguard (a manipulation-resistant oracle, a bound, corrected math), not an authorization check or a reentrancy guard. The manipulable price or invariant is the source, the value the attacker extracts is the sink, and a value decision that trusts a movable input is the bug.
UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills · ★ 4 · AI & Automation · score 80
Install: claude install-skill UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
# Hunting DeFi economic and oracle flaws: profiting by moving a price nobody bounded Some of the most valuable protocol bugs break no access check and re-enter nothing: they move a price or exploit accounting math to extract value through actions the protocol permits. A contract reads a spot price a flash loan can swing inside one transaction, trusts a pool ratio an attacker sets, or rounds a fee in a direction a repeated call drains. This hunt is about the economic layer, the values a protocol trusts and the invariants it assumes hold. It is distinct from access control (nothing here requires a missing gate) and from reentrancy (nothing here requires re-entry); if the fix is a manipulation-resistant oracle, a sanity bound, or corrected math, it is an economic flaw and belongs here. The discipline in a crowded field is proving the manipulation is profitable after costs, not just that a price can move. ## When to use - A protocol reads a price, a pool ratio, or a share value to make a swap, loan, or liquidation decision. - Fee, rounding, or share math runs on values an attacker can influence within a transaction. - You want to know whether an attacker can profit by moving a price or breaking an accounting invariant. ## Scope check Analyze only protocols you own or are authorized to assess, and simulate an economic exploit only on a fork or test network, a manipulation here extracts real value from real liquidity providers. Prove profitability on a fork. If you can't name