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auditing-jit-provisioning-and-role-mappinglisted

Audit just-in-time account provisioning at federated (SAML or OIDC) login for trust misplaced in the assertion that drives it: a first login that creates an account and assigns roles from identity-provider claims (groups, email domain, department) the service never validates, a claim-to-role mapping that grants more privilege than the claim should or defaults new users into a privileged role, an email or domain claim trusted to auto-join a tenant so an attacker with a lookalike address lands inside it, and a JIT update that re-elevates an account on every login from mutable claims. Use when a federated login provisions an account and the mapping from assertion claims to local roles and tenancy is the boundary. The attacker-shaped login assertion is the source, the over-privileged or wrong-tenant provisioned account is the sink, and the unvalidated claim or over-granting role mapping is the bug.
UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills · ★ 5 · AI & Automation · score 80
Install: claude install-skill UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
# Auditing JIT provisioning and role mapping: the first login decides the role, from claims you did not issue Just-in-time provisioning creates a local account the first time someone logs in through a federated identity provider, and often updates that account's roles on every subsequent login, all from the claims in the login assertion. The claims, group memberships, an email, a domain, a department, come from the identity provider, not from you, so JIT hands account creation and role assignment to whatever the assertion says. That is fine when the mapping is tight and the claims are validated, and dangerous when either is loose. A claim-to-role mapping that grants more privilege than the claim should, or defaults every new user into a privileged role, elevates at first login. An email or domain claim trusted to auto-join a tenant or organization lets an attacker with a lookalike or attacker-controlled address land inside it. A JIT update that re-reads mutable claims every login can re-elevate or reassign an account an admin previously corrected. And any claim provisioned without validation, an unverified email, a group the attacker can influence, an unsigned or overtrusted assertion field, becomes an access grant. The audit follows a federated login into the account and roles it creates and checks that every claim is validated and every mapping is minimal. You audit this by logging in with shaped assertions and seeing what account and privilege you are given. ## When to u