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auditing-datastore-exposure-and-abuselisted

Audit in-memory and cache datastores such as Redis and memcached for exposure and command abuse: an instance reachable without authentication, a request that composes datastore commands from untrusted input, or server-side scripting and module or config commands that reach code execution or a file write. Covers unauthenticated network exposure, command injection where input becomes a command rather than a value, Lua or scripting evaluation on untrusted input, and dangerous administrative commands that rewrite the on-disk file or load a module. Use when an application talks to a cache or key-value store and either the instance is network-reachable or untrusted input reaches the command layer. The untrusted input or the open port is the source, the datastore command interface is the sink, and the unauthenticated access or the composed dangerous command is the bug.
UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills · ★ 4 · AI & Automation · score 80
Install: claude install-skill UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
# Auditing datastore exposure and abuse: when the cache is an unauthenticated shell Cache and key-value stores such as Redis and memcached are built for speed inside a trusted network, and that assumption is exactly what makes them dangerous when it does not hold. Two failures dominate. First, exposure: an instance bound to a reachable interface with no authentication is an open command interface, and on some stores the command set reaches configuration changes, on-disk file rewrites, module loading, and scripting, so an open port is a path to code execution, not just data theft. Second, command abuse: when an application composes datastore commands from untrusted input, the attacker can inject extra commands or reach a scripting or administrative command the application never intended. You audit both by checking how the instance is reached and how commands are composed. ## When to use - An application talks to a cache or key-value store such as Redis or memcached. - A datastore instance may be bound to a reachable interface or lack authentication. - Untrusted input reaches the command layer, a scripting evaluation, or a key or command name. ## Scope check Test datastore exposure and abuse only against instances and applications you own or are authorized to assess, on non-production data. A confirming command can change configuration, write files, or run a script on the host, so treat every proof as a live intrusion inside the authorized scope. If you can't name the auth