auditing-container-image-provenancelisted

# Auditing container image provenance: when the tag is not the artifact The image a workload runs is the code it runs, and a container reference is only a promise about which bytes those are. A mutable tag can point at different content over time, so a workload pinned to a tag runs whatever that tag resolves to at pull time, not the artifact that was reviewed. Signing and provenance attestation exist to close that gap, but only if they are enforced at admission rather than merely produced in the pipeline: a signature nobody verifies is decoration, and an attestation the cluster does not require proves nothing to the cluster. The failure is quiet because the workload starts and runs; the question is whether what it runs is provably the artifact you intended. You audit this by tracing each workload's image reference back to a verified digest and confirming the cluster refuses anything unproven. ## When to use - Workloads reference images by mutable tags rather than immutable content digests. - Image signing or provenance attestation is produced but may not be enforced at admission. - Images are pulled from registries or base images whose origin the pipeline does not verify. ## Scope check Audit image provenance only for clusters, registries, and pipelines you own or are authorized to assess. A confirming test may push a benign image or retag one in a registry you control, so stay inside the authorized registry and remove any test artifact. If you can't name the authorizati