offensive-supply-chain

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Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) an

AI & Automation 3,234 stars 523 forks Updated 1 weeks ago MIT

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Skill Content

# Offensive Supply Chain Attacks Software supply chain attacks exploit the trust relationships between developers, package registries, build systems, and deployment pipelines. You target the components and processes that organizations depend on but rarely audit with the same rigor as their own code. A single compromised dependency can propagate across thousands of downstream consumers, making supply chain the highest leverage attack surface in modern software ecosystems. This skill covers the offensive lifecycle: reconnaissance of internal package names, exploitation of registry resolution logic, build system hook abuse, CI/CD pipeline tampering, and container image supply chain attacks. Every technique maps to authorized red team engagement patterns with safe callback mechanisms. ## Quick Workflow 1. Enumerate internal package names from target artifacts (lock files, source maps, error messages, GitHub repos). 2. Identify the package ecosystem (npm, PyPI, NuGet, Maven, Go, Ruby) and registry configuration. 3. Select attack vector: dependency confusion, typosquatting, build hook injection, CI/CD tampering, or container supply chain. 4. Prepare a safe proof-of-concept package with DNS canary or HTTP callback -- no destructive payload. 5. Register the package on the public registry or stage the artifact for injection. 6. Monitor for callback to confirm execution in the target environment. 7. Document the attack path, affected systems, and remediation guidance. --- ## Depe...

Details

Author
SnailSploit
Repository
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Created
6 months ago
Last Updated
1 weeks ago
Language
Python
License
MIT

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