← ClaudeAtlas

database-securitylisted

Prevent SQL and NoSQL injection, unsafe ORM and raw-query use, over-privileged database identities, weak tenant isolation, and unauthenticated database transport. Use when generating SQL or raw query strings, NoSQL filters, ORM models or queries, database migration files, or connection strings.
ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe · ★ 22 · API & Backend · score 79
Install: claude install-skill ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe
<!-- Native skill bundle for Claude Code. Generated by `secure-vibe dev regenerate`. --> <!-- Do not edit by hand; the source of truth is skills/database-security/SKILL.md. --> # Database Security Prevent SQL and NoSQL injection, unsafe ORM and raw-query use, over-privileged database identities, weak tenant isolation, and unauthenticated database transport. Use when generating SQL or raw query strings, NoSQL filters, ORM models or queries, database migration files, or connection strings. ## ALWAYS - Bind every untrusted data value through the driver or ORM parameter API. Never place it into SQL with language-level interpolation or concatenation — `+`, f-strings, `%` formatting, `.format()`, JavaScript template interpolation. Driver placeholders (`%s`, `?`, `$1`, `:name`, `@name`) are the binding *mechanism*, not string formatting; confusing the two is how this rule is most often misread. The same applies to values read back out of the database and used to build a later query: stored input is still input, and second-order injection is this bug with a delay. - Prefer the ORM's structured query-expression API over textual SQL. Where raw SQL is genuinely needed, use that framework's documented parameter-binding mechanism and never interpolate untrusted values into it. `references/orm-safe-query-examples.md` carries the verified form per framework. - For SQL structure that cannot be a bind parameter — table and column identifiers, sort direction, sometimes the operator itself