zkp-security-reviewlisted

# ZKP Security Review Audit the end-to-end proof-system claim. Keep completeness, soundness, knowledge, zero knowledge, setup, composition, and efficiency as independent dimensions. ## Scope In scope: relation/transcript/setup, security definitions, reductions/extractors/simulators, Fiat-Shamir ROM/QROM, polynomial commitments, arithmetization, aggregation/recursion/folding/IVC, parameters/errors, and proof-system costs. Out of scope: accepting protocol security from one local lemma, implementation side-channel certification, or inventing missing security proofs. ## Required Inputs - protocol/specification and exact proof version; - relation/language, instance/witness, transcript and public parameters; - claimed properties, adversary, setup/model, assumptions, and parameter set; - dependent primitives/proofs and intended composition/deployment. ## Success Criteria - Each property has its own definition, adversary/model, error, proof status, and limitation. - Setup/trapdoor/updatability/transparency assumptions are explicit. - Fiat-Shamir transcript binding, oracle model, query loss, and classical/quantum status are checked. - Composition, aggregation, recursion/folding/IVC implication steps are explicit. - Parameter, soundness/knowledge/correctness errors and reduction losses are accumulated. - Costs separate constraints, prover/verifier, proof size, setup, online, amortized, communication, memory, and operation model. - End-to-end verdict stops at the first unsupport