openclaw-trust

Solid

Apply OpenClaw’s official threat model and trust guidance (MITRE ATLAS–mapped) when evaluating risky workflows, skills, channel exposure, prompt injection, and tool execution safety.

AI & Automation 36 stars 22 forks Updated today MIT

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Quality Score: 82/100

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Skill Content

# OpenClaw Trust Use this skill when the user asks about security posture, threat modeling, attack vectors, trust boundaries, or safe rollout decisions for OpenClaw automations. ## Source of truth - Repo: `openclaw/trust` - Core files: - `threats.yaml` — machine-readable threat model - `CONTRIBUTING.md` — how to submit threats/mitigations/chains - Public render: `trust.openclaw.ai/trust/threatmodel` - Vulnerability reporting: `security@openclaw.ai` ## What to apply in practice ### 1) Default to the highest-risk classes first Prioritize controls for risks repeatedly marked high/critical in the trust model: - Prompt injection (direct + indirect) - Malicious skills / compromised skill updates - Token theft from local config - Tool argument injection and command execution abuse - MCP/tool over-permission ### 2) Translate trust model into concrete controls When recommending hardening, prefer specific actions: - Default-deny sender/channel access (`AllowFrom` least privilege) - Approval gates for state-changing actions - Strict tool argument validation (no free-form shell interpolation) - Limit/monitor skill install/update sources - Least-privilege MCP server config - Audit logs for new sender authorization + sensitive actions - Token hygiene (rotation, minimize plaintext exposure) ### 3) Separate threat reporting vs vuln disclosure - Threat model additions/updates → `openclaw/trust` issues/PRs - Live exploitable vulnerabilities → responsible disclosure via Trust page/...

Details

Author
OpenCoven
Repository
OpenCoven/coven
Created
3 months ago
Last Updated
today
Language
Rust
License
MIT

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